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Domestic and International Arbitration in
Italy after the Legislative Reform
Giorgio Berninit
I.

Dual Nature of Arbitration in Italy

In Italy arbitration must be viewed from a dual angle, corresponding to a deep rooted distinction between arbitratorituale
(procedural arbitration),1 and arbitrato irrituale (free, or contractual, arbitration).2 Even after the enactment of Law no. 28
of February 9, 1983, which amended the legal discipline of arbitration,' this distinction remains although its theoretical and
practical impact may be deemed greatly reduced.4
The essential features of arbitraggio (determination of the
t Professor of Commercial Law, University of Bologna; LL.M, S.J.D., University of
Michigan; Member, International Council of Commercial Arbitration (ICCA); Executive
Committee, Associazione Italiana per l'Arbitrato (AIA); Advocate, Studio Bernini,
Bologna.
1. See CODICE DI PROCEDURA cIVILE of 1942 [C.r.c.] tit. VIII, arts. 806-831 (Italy).

2. See

CODICE CIVILE OF

1942 [C.c.] art. 1332 et seq. (Italy).

3. See 8 Y.B. COM. ARB. 327 (1983). For an English translation of the pertinent articles of the C.P.c., see 9 Y.B. COM. ARB. 309 (1984).
4. See infra Section VI.
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contractual object by a third person) and perizia contrattuale
(technical expertise) should also be sketched, because sometimes
these two figures and arbitratoirrituale
the borderline between
6
remains uncertain.
II.

Arbitrato Rituale and Arbitrato Irrituale

One is faced with arbitratorituale (procedural arbitration)
whenever the parties intend to request a jurisdictional type of
activity from the arbitrator(s) that leads to an award (lodo),
which may acquire the status of a judgment (res judicata) by
means of a leave of enforcement (exequatur) granted by the local Magistrate Court (Pretura).
One is faced with arbitrato irrituale (contractual arbitration) whenever the parties intend to settle a dispute by means of
a decision in the (private law) form of a contract. Arbitrato irrituale draws its strength from the contractual autonomy of the
parties recognized by article 1322 of the Civil Code, whereby
they "can freely determine the content of the contract within
the limits imposed by the law. The parties can also make contracts that are not of the types that are particularly regulated,
provided that they are aimed at the realization of interests worthy of protection according to the legal order." 6
The arbitral award stemming from an arbitratoirrituale is
binding upon the parties but has no executory force. Lacking
voluntary performance, the party concerned must inevitably
turn to the courts in order to secure enforcement. Recourse to
the courts may take the form of ordinary proceedings or, under
certain circumstances, a request for summary judgment (Decreto
Ingiuntivo). In either-case, however, only the final judgment rendered by the court will have the force of res judicata, thus allowing the winning party to carry it into effect by means of execution proceedings.
Differences have arisen among legal writers and court decisions concerning the legal nature of an arbitratoirrituale.These
differences range from the most radical theories purporting that
arbitrato irrituale is only to be found when the animus tran-

5.. See infra Section IV.
6. C.c. art. 1322.
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sigendi (the intent to settle the dispute amicably) of the parties
can be clearly identified (thus equating it with a friendly compromise), to the more hazy theory that through arbitratoirrituale the parties are merely deemed to give rise to a so called
negozio di accertamento. This latter definition requires a clarification. The accertamento (ascertainment) is the process aimed
at converting a situation of uncertainty into a situation of certainty. As a consequence, the negozio di accertamento is a contract by which the parties aim to solve a dispute without recourse to judicial proceedings. It differs from a compromise (or
friendly settlement) in the strict sense because in the negozio di
accertamento no animus transigendi is to be found, since the
parties do not negotiate and settle conflicting claims, but merely
set the terms and conditions under which the definition of the
difference by a third party (arbitrator) is to be viewed as a binding clarification of the real intent of such parties.
Under the former theory (friendly settlement) in arbitrato
irrituale the arbitrators should adjudge only ex aequo et bono
(as amiable compositeurs),7 whereas the supporters of the latter

7. The expression "amichevoli compositori" (amiables compositeurs) was adopted
by art. 20 of the former Civil Procedure Code of 1865. The Civil Procedure Code of 1942,
presently in force, uses the expressions "in equita" (in equity) and "valutazione equitativa (equitable evaluation) in a number of articles, as does the Civil Code. The expression "ex bono et aequo," coming from the Roman law tradition, can be fully equated
with the expression "in equitb." The Roman law doctrine of aequitas mainly signified
the adaptation of the rules of jus strictum to the needs of each individual case. This
doctrine, of paramount importance throughout the development of the Roman law, probably found its earliest support in certain procedural formulae (typical of the Roman
judicial system), called in bonum et aequum conceptae, which required the judge to set
the amount of the condemnation ex bono et aequo, or in quantum aequius melius iudici
visum fuerit, which meant taking into account all features of each individual case.
The expression "amichevoli compositori" is still frequently used in many arbitration
agreements. Under the overwhelming weight of opinion, the phrase should be interpreted
in the sense that the arbitrators are authorized to adjudge "in equita." See the numerous
judicial precedents cited by VECCmoNE, L'ARnrrRATo NM SISTEMA DEL PROCESSO CIVILE
565 n.178 (1951). More recent authorities (doctrinal as well as judicial) have widely debated the notion of "equitil." At the risk of oversimplification, one may be permitted to
state that the old Roman definition, as sketched above, still holds. One conclusion, however, emerges clearly from the majority opinion. When adjudging in equity, arbitrators
(as well as judges) should, in the first place, never depart from the logical canons presiding over legal reasoning. Concepts and basic value judgments should be borrowed from
the domain of law. Equity, because of its greater breadth, may be viewed as a system
encompassing the whole body of the legal norms. But it can never depart from the basic
philosophy inspiring these norms by replacing the quintessence of legal principles with
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theory (negozio di accertamento) maintain that even an award
rendered according to legal rules can fall within the scope of an
arbitrato irrituale.

Be that as it may, one should realistically stress that the
impact of these divergent views on the legal nature of arbitrato
irritualeis mainly confined to the dogmatic features of the definition, without entailing any substantial consequences upon the
ambit in which the parties are permitted to make use of this
type of arbitration. Today, there is no reasonable doubt that
even in the framework of arbitrato irrituale, the parties may
validly confer upon the arbitrators the power to decide under
the law and not merely as amiable compositeurs.8
III. How to Distinguish Between Arbitrato Rituale and
Irrituale

Both legal writers and court decisions consistently hold
that, when faced with an arbitration clause or agreement, reference should be made to the will of the parties in order to ascertain whether they intended to give rise to an arbitratorituale as
opposed to an arbitratoirrituale. In the words of the Supreme
Court of Cassation:
The distinction between arbitratorituale and irrituale must

be traced back to the intent of the parties. In the first case, such
intent is aimed at attributing to the arbitrators a jurisdictional
function in order to secure from them a decision susceptible to
acquiring efficacy similar to that of a judicial decision. In the second case, the parties attribute to the arbitrator the function of
giving birth to a negozio di accertamento,which must be referred
exclusively to the intent of the parties.9
arbitrary and casual rules of conduct drawn from the arbitrator's individual notion of
fairness and justice. Furthermore, while deciding in equity the arbitrators must always
comply with principles of public policy (ordine pubblico).
8. Recent case law has admitted that even in arbitratoirrituale,the award may be
rendered according to the rules of law, provided, however, that this is expressly requested by the parties. See -Judgment of Mar. 9, 1982, Court of Cassation, No. 1519;
Judgment of Dec. 3, 1981, Court of Cassation, No. 6414; Judgment of Nov. 17, 1981,
Court of Cassation, No. 6099; Judgment of July 4, 1981, Court of Cassation, No. 4360.
For a doctrinal opinion, see, e.g., Punzi, La Riforma sull'arbitrato,in RIVISTA DI DIRIrro
PROCESSUALE 80 (1983).
9. Judgment of Oct. 1, 1969, Court of Cassation, No. 3150. See also Judgment of
Jan. 8, 1980, Court of Cassation, No. 975; Judgment of June 14, 1979, Court of Cassation,
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In most circumstances, however, tracing the parties' intent
is more easily said than done. In construing such intent, paramount consideration has to be given to the wording of the arbitration agreement or clause. The scale will weigh in favour of
arbitrato rituale whenever the parties make reference to an
award having the efficacy of a judgment, or ask for the application of the rules on arbitration provided for by the Civil Procedure Code. On the other hand, recourse to arbitrato irrituale
will be envisaged whenever one is faced with provisions whereby
the parties undertake to abide by the award as an expression of
their own contractual intent, or otherwise make it clear that
they are not entrusting the arbitrator(s) with a jurisdictional (or
jurisdiction-like) function, but rather are seeking a decision
without "formalities." Reference to "amiable composition," or to
an award to be decided in equity (ex aequo et bono), does not
indicate as such a recourse to arbitrato irrituale, in view of the
principle already mentioned that in arbitratoirritualethe arbitrators may also decide under the legal rules. Conversely, even in
arbitrato rituale the arbitrator(s) may decide in equity if the
parties so provide. This is why a "caveat" is put forward against
past holdings giving too much weight to the finding that arbitrators were asked to decide as amiable compositeurs, thereby tipping the scale in favor of arbitratoirrituale.
Given the uncertainty of the matter, it is strongly suggested
that when drafting the arbitration agreement or clause, the parties insert the sacramental word rituale, or irrituale,in order to
identify beyond doubt the type of arbitration they have in mind.
IV.

Arbitraggio and Perizia Contrattuale

In a case of arbitraggio,the appointed third party is called
upon to make a determination by completing or filling in certain
elements of a contract already executed by the parties. The
main regulation of arbitraggiois set forth under Article 1349 of
the Civil Code, drawing a distinction between a determination
rendered as bonus vir as opposed to a determination rendered
according to the arbitrium merum of the third appointed
person.

No. 3348; Judgment of Nov. 29, 1978, Court of Cassation, No. 5651.
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In the first case, the power entrusted to the third appointed
person must be exercised within the limits of equity, justice and
reasonableness. In the second case, no limits are set on the discretionary judgment of the third appointed person. The difference has obvious repercussions upon the scope of the claims that
the dissatisfied party may eventually bring before the courts. In
a case of arbitrium boni viri, decisions may be challenged by alleging that they are "manifestly inequitable" or "erroneous,"
thus inevitably re-opening the merits of the case to judicial review. This possibility does not exist in arbitrato,be it rituale or
irrituale.
In the case of arbitrium merum, claims can be based only
on allegations of bad faith or fraud on the part of the third appointed person. Article 1349 of the Civil Code provides further
that unless the parties specify their intent to the contrary, there
is a rebuttable presumption that they intend the third appointed person to act as bonus vir.
The determination of a contractual element by a third person falls within the scope of the contract of mandatum (mandate). Consequently, the determination by the third appointed
person, which in arbitraggiois called arbitratore,as opposed to
arbitro (the person appointed in arbitration proceedings stricto
sensu), has a purely contractual nature, and can never acquire
the force of res judicata by means of a leave of enforcement. 0
In practice, it is sometimes difficult to differentiate between
arbitratoirritualeand arbitraggio,although in principle the two
categories are different in their structural elements as well in
their respective functions.
Another borderline category is that of the perizia contrattuale, which prevailing case law recognizes as an autonomous and
distinct category as opposed to arbitratoirrituale.As in the case
of the distinction between arbitrato irrituale and arbitraggio,
the borderline between perizia contrattuale and arbitrato irrituale remains very uncertain, as demonstrated by the fact that
the perizia contrattuale is often differently defined as perizia
tecnica, perizia arbitrale, perizia stragiudiziale, arbitraggio

10. On the difference between arbitrato irrituale and arbitraggio, see Judgment of

Mar. 20, 1972, Court of Cassation, No. 854; Judgment of Apr. 20, 1968, Court of Cassation, No. 1223.
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tecnico, and arbitrato tecnico.11
At the risk of oversimplification, it can be stated that the
perizia contrattuale is a "species" within the "genus" of arbitraggio, in the sense that it consists of a determination by a
third person and is characterized by its eminently technical content. In other words, there exists a perizia contrattuale whenever the parties entrust to one or more persons a technical assessment, finding, or project, relying only upon their specific
competence, and therefore excluding any discretionary judgment
or prudent appreciation on the part of the third appointed person(s). In particular, it has been held that the task of the third
appointed person(s) may consist of, among other things, an inspection of accounts, works or sites, or an appraisal of the quality of goods delivered in order to ascertain whether they are in
conformity with the quality contracted for.
In the latter case, consisting in reality of a valuation, it
again becomes hard to differentiate between perizia contrattuale (or tecnica) and quality (or commodity) arbitration carried
out by means of an arbitrato irrituale. However, since quality
arbitration is generally carried out by means of arbitrato irrituale, the identification of perizia contrattuale as an independent
tertium genus does not entail much practical consequence.
In order to shed light on a trilogy (arbitratoirrituale,arbitraggio, and perizia contrattuale) which may be likely to raise
some perplexities in terms of separate classification, it may be
helpful to compare notions prevailing in other systems, such as
the Dutch bindend advies, the German Schiedgutachten and
the English "valuation", which appear to be akin to the Italian
perizia contrattuale. It is unquestionable that bindend advies,
Schiedgutachten, and "valuation", as well as perizia contrattuale, rest upon a contractual basis, although they are aimed at
solving factual rather than legal issues. As a consequence, if not
complied with, they can be taken before the ordinary courts for
enforcement and a marginal control on the merits of the decision
can be exercised by the court itself.1 2

11. Judgment of June 14, 1979, Court of Cassation, No. 3348.
12. See Sanders, National Reports, The Netherlands, 6 Y.B. COM.
Glossner, National Reports, Federal Republic of Germany, 4 Y.B. COM.
Gill, National Reports, United Kingdom, 2 Y.B. CoM. ARB. 93 (1977).

ARB.
ARB.

61 (1981);
62 (1979);

7

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:543

This is not true for arbitrato irrituale,where the merits of
the decision are not re-opened by the court before which enforcement is sought. This is why, under Italian doctrine and case
law, as among the above cited trilogy, only arbitratoirrituale is
deemed to amount to arbitration in the proper sense.
V.

The Legislative Reform

The reform was carried out through the enactment of Law
No. 28 of February 9, 1983. The rules contained in the Law are
few in number, but are of paramount importance to the goal of
harmonizing Italian domestic legislation with the provisions of
the multilateral conventions on arbitration to which Italy has
adhered: in particular, the New York Convention of 1958"s and
the Geneva Convention of 1961,14 which entered into force in Italy on May 1, 1969 and August 3, 1970, respectively.
A.

Article One

Article one, by amending article 812(1) of the Code of Civil
Procedure (C.P.C.), does justice to the cause of arbitration by
abolishing an obsolete restriction whereby only Italian citizens
could act as arbitrators.
Although the bar to foreign arbitrators applied only to arbitrato rituale, the amendment is to be praised as representing
the dutiful acknowledgement of an elementary need of international arbitration which hardly deserves comment. Futher, it
represents an act of due abidance with the principle already
adopted by the drafters of the Geneva Convention of 1961.
B.

Article Two

By entirely rephrasing numbers five and six of article 823(2)
of the C.P.C., article two of the Law sets the main principles
characterizing the features of the new discipline of arbitration as
summarized below.
13. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter cited as
New York Convention].
14. European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Apr. 21, 1961,
484 U.N.T.S. 364 [hereinafter cited as Geneva Convention of 1961].

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss3/1
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1. The award must contain an indication of the place
where the arbitrators rendered their deliberations. 15 The former
text of the article in question merely referred to the date and
place in which the award was subscribed by the arbitrators: the
impact of the amendment is considerable for the reasons discussed below.
2. Under the new text of article 823(2)(6), the award must
contain the signatures of all the arbitrators, together with an indication of the date on which each signature is affixed. This signature may be affixed in a place other than where the deliberation was rendered, even if outside Italy. If there is more than
one arbitrator, the various signatures may be affixed in different
places without the need for the arbitrators to reconvene in a personal conference. Throughout the Law a distinction is thus created between the deliberation (that is, decision) of the award,
which is to be carried out in Italy by the arbitrators in personal
conference, and the signing of the award, which can take place
outside of Italy (each arbitrator being allowed to affix his signature individually).
3. Finally, a new paragraph is added to the text of article
823, reading as follows: "The award has binding force between
the parties as of the date of its last signature."
C. Article Three
As a due corollary to the principles laid down in article two of
the Law, article three of the Law further provides:
1. that the award must be issued in a number of originals
equal to that of the parties;
2. that one original of the award must be delivered to each
party within ten days of the last signature even by registered
mail;
3. that the party intending to secure enforcement of the
award within the territory of the Republic must, within one year
from receipt of the award, deposit the original with the Magistrate Court (Pretura)of the place where the award is deliberated, together with the agreement to arbitrate, or the arbitration
clause, or an equivalent document;

15. C.P.c. art. 823(2)(5).
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that the time limit noted above is peremptory in nature.

Article Four

In accordance with the principles illustrated above, article four
of the Law brings about the proper amendments to article
829(5) of the C.P.C., establishing the grounds of nullity for lack
of formal requirements of the award. Under the former text of
article 829 the award was null and void (rectius, legally inexistent) if the deposit of the award with the Magistrate Court,
which was then compulsory, was not effected by the arbitrators
within the unreasonably short time limit of five days from the
date in which they signed the award. Under the new rules, the
deposit is no longer obligatory, and the parties may, if they so
wish, deposit the award with the Magistrate Court within one
year from its receipt.
This amounts to a paramount novelty in the Italian arbitral
milieu, as it sanctions the fall of a long lasting idol: the principle
whereby in arbitratorituale, the award was null and void if deposit with the Magistrate Court was omitted or delayed beyond
five days from the date of signature, as sternly sanctioned by the
former article 829(5) of the C.P.C. This was the logical consequence stemming from the jurisdictional (or procedural) nature
of arbitrato rituale, whereby the award came into "legal existence" only after securing the exequatur from the Magistrate
Court.
With the deposit of the award with the Magistrate Court
thus becoming facultative, it will be up to the interested party to
decide, in its prudent discretion, whether it wishes to keep the
award at the merely obligatory stage, or secure the exequatur by
depositing the award with the Magistrate Court within one year
from its receipt. The new Law, therefore, recognizes the contractual nature of arbitration even within the framework of arbitrato rituale.
VI.

The Impact of the Reform on the Legal Discipline of
Arbitration in Italy.

Through the reform, the Italian legal discipline of arbitration has vastly improved. This reform, although de minimis in
terms of the number of rules touched upon, was strategically

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss3/1
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aimed at revising only those norms which still hampered the
harmonious insertion of the New York and Geneva Conventions
into the Italian legal system. In addition to this specific revision,
a more general improvement of the legal framework of arbitration (domestic, as well as international) resulted, in the fulfillment of business needs which have overwhelmingly emerged in
the last decades.
As pointed out above, purely contractual arbitration (i.e.,
arbitrato irrituale), though widely practiced, is unavoidably afflicted by an "inner weakness," because this type of arbitration
only gives rise to awards which can never be granted the leave of
enforcement (exequatur). This involves the necessity of recourse
to the judiciary (though somewhat simplified by the availability
of a summary procedure, the decreto ingiuntivo) should the
award need enforcement against a recalcitrant losing party.
On the contrary, when choosing jurisdictional or procedural
arbitration (arbitratorituale), the parties were, in the past, always forced to go to the very end of the road. In other words,
they could not avoid a sanction of nullity, which would have deprived the award of all legal effect, in the event that the arbitrators failed to deposit the award with the Magistrate Court (to
secure the exequatur) within the unreasonably short term of five
days. The parties were thus faced with an irreversible course of
action which might have proven uselessly burdensome in many
circumstances. This course was particularly burdensome where
no interest existed to secure the exequatur in Italy by means of
the deposit, as for example, whenever the losing party was prepared to honour the award spontaneously or enforcement was to
take place against parties located, or owning assets, outside of
Italy.
The overall unfairness of the dilemma thus imposed upon
the potential utilizers of arbitration hardly needs further elucidation. The result was a slowing down in the progress of arbitration, in striking contrast with the practice prevailing in other
countries. This was even more true in the field of international
arbitration, where recourse to arbitrato irrituale still entailed
problems of recognition and enforcement under the New York
Convention. Recourse to arbitrato rituale was not to be suggested light-heartedly to a foreign party, in view of the stringent
mandatory rules limiting (without the scope of the Geneva Con-
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vention of 1961) the arbitral function to Italian citizens, and
making the deposit of the award obligatory in Italy even if the
enforcement was ultimately to take place in another country. 6
It must be recognized that even prior to the reform, the
Italian judiciary did its utmost to overcome the difficulties
pointed out above. The Supreme Court of Cassation went so far
as to explicity hold that even arbitrato irrituale falls with the
scope of the New York Convention. 17 But a different principle
may prevail in other countries. The Oberlandesgerichtof
Hamburg, for instance, held that the New York Convention is
15
not applicable to arbitrato irrituale.
After the reform a situation of full legal certainty prevails,
since recourse to arbitrato rituale no longer entails the arbitrators' obligation to deposit the award with the Magistrate Court.
The parties themselves are now granted the reasonable time of
one year to decide whether they wish to secure the exequatur in
Italy by means of deposit. It is expressly provided that before
the lapse of this time limit, and afterwards, if the parties choose
not to effect the deposit, the award shall maintain its binding
force as if it were a contract, subject only to the ordinary periods
of limitation (delays of prescription) as set forth by the law.
In the framework of the New York and Geneva Conventions, the elimination of the obligation to deposit the award in
Italy is greatly welcomed. In the past, whenever an award stemming from arbitratorituale was to be enforced abroad, the legal
necessity of the prior deposit in Italy brought about the ghost of
16. See Bernini, The Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards by National Judiciaries: A Trial of the New York Convention's Ambit and Workability, in THE ART OF
ARBITRATION 51 (1982).
17. Judgment of Sept. 18, 1978, Court of Cassation, No. 4167, reprinted in 4 Y.B.
COM. ARB. 296 (1979).
18. The judgment of the Oberlandesgericht,denying the application of the New

York Convention to the Italian arbitrato irrituale was criticized by some writers. See
Lalive, Enforcing Awards, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION - 60 YEARS OF ICC ARBITRATION 326 (1984); Ferrante, About the nature (national or a-national,contractual or jurisdictional)of ICC Awards under the New York Convention, in THE ART OF ARBITRATION 129 (1982); Bernini, The Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards by National
Judiciaries:A Trial of the New York Convention's Ambit and Workability, in THE ART
OF ARBITRATION 51 (1982). Other writers argue to the contrary, asserting that arbitrato
irritualeshould not fall within the scope of the New York Convention. Their views coincide with the holding of the German Court. See Sanders, in 4 Y.B. CoM. ARB. 233 (1979);
A. J. VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION -CONVENTION OF 1958, at 48 (1981).
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the "double exequatur," in flagrant contradiction with the provisions of the conventions. Now, the facultative nature of the deposit has smoothly inserted awards rendered in Italy into the
system of recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards
devised by the drafters of these conventions.'9
VII.

The Impact of the Reform on International Commercial
Arbitration

The new Law will greatly help the enforcement of bilateral
and multilateral conventions on arbitration to which Italy has
adhered. Whenever the arbitral venue is to be located within the
territory of the Italian Republic, foreign parties as well as foreign arbitrators will feel at ease by facing rules and practices
generally accepted at the international level.
No esoteric principles drawn from Italian domestic legislation will obstruct the inception or the regular progress of international arbitration. After the close of proceedings, the issuance
of an award requires the presence of the arbitrators in Italy only
at the stage of deliberation of the award, when the decision on
the whole of the issues involved is actually formed, unanimously
or by majority. Total informality is allowed insofar as the drafting of the award and the affixing of the signatures are concerned.
As a matter of fact, after deliberation of the award, the arbitrators are not obligated to reconvene, since the whole process can
take place by correspondence. The arbitrators exhaust their
function by delivering the award to the parties, even by registered mail, within ten days of the date in which the signature is
affixed on the document by the arbitrator last signing the award.
Under the new Law, therefore, not only are foreign citizens
dutifully allowed to act as arbitrators, but their participation in
proceedings carried out in Italy is made easier by limiting to the
barest minimum the requirements which may burden the fulfilment of their duties. Also the arbitrators' responsibility is confined to the performance of their functions, and they need not
worry any longer about the deposit of the award with the Magis19. With reference to the binding nature of the award as opposed to its definitiveness, see Bernini, supra note 16, at 56-61; Bernini, Observations Regarding Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in Italy, in COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 39,
54 (1974).
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trate Court which, as pointed out above, was entrusted to the
arbitrators under the former rule of article 825 of the C.P.C.
Foreign parties may now have access to arbitration in Italy
without undue fear concerning the legal status of the ensuing
award. Prior to the reform, a foreign party had to be keenly
aware of the difference between arbitrato rituale and arbitrato
irrituale;both types of arbitrations, if handled carelessly, could
in fact raise problems at the level of international arbitration.
Now, even if such difference still exists in principle, the "drama"
is taken out of the choice. Furthermore, after the reform, if a
foreign party elects to arbitrate in Italy, the arbitration agreement or clause will be conclusively construed, in light of the
amended provisions of the C.P.C., as giving rise to arbitrato
rituale - in other words, to arbitral proceedings in full compliance with the New York and Geneva Conventions. Should the
parties still wish to refer to arbitrato irrituale (with the aim of
securing an award binding only at the contractual level without
any legal possibility for the award to be granted the exequatur
in Italy), they will have to unequivocally state their intent whilst
drafting the arbitration agreement or clause.
The practice under the new Law is still too young to allow
considered conclusions on the role which is left to arbitratoirrituale after the amendments to the discipline of arbitratorituale. It is expected that arbitrato irrituale will survive, at least
up to a certain extent, whenever there exist situations in which
the parties are reasonably confident of spontaneous abidance
with the award. This may be the case, for example, when one is
faced with arbitration in the framework of close-knit trade associations, where parties, as a general rule, do not fail to comply
with arbitration awards. A contrary course of action would be
considered repugnant to their status as members and would
even call for sanction from the association as such. In Italy, as
pointed out above, arbitratoirrituale is generally the rule with
quality (or commodity) arbitrations carried out within the
framework of the respective trade associations (for example,
grain, leather, and silk).2 0 Be that as it may, it should be emphasized that a foreign party is free to agree, under Italian law, to
the type of arbitration which it deems is suited to its needs, and
20. R. DAVM, L'AEIrrRAGE DANS LE COMMERCE
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may accede in Italy to any proceedings in pursuance thereof.
The autonomy of the parties represents a sacrosanct principle
which is given full recognition under the Italian law on
arbitration.
In preparing the reform, special attention was paid to the
regulations laid down in the New York and Geneva Conventions,
as well as to the rules of the major bodies and associations administering international arbitration. The lawmaker was not insensitive to the needs of international commercial arbitration,
and thus provided the means for the effective harmonization of
the Italian domestic provisions with the principles and practices
generally accepted in the international business community.
VIII.

The Legal Doctrine and the New Features of Arbitrato
Rituale After the Reform

No judicial decision has yet appeared defining the impact of
the Law on the overall features of arbitratorituale. The problem has been tackled by legal writers with divergent conclusions.2 1 The majority view, though expressed with some minor

21. Andrioli, La novella sull'arbitrato, in DIRrrO E GIURISPRUDENZA 249 (1983);
Bernini, La legge 9 Febbraio 1983, n. 28 e la modifica dell'arbitrato:prospettive internazionali, in RASSEGNA DELL'ARBrrARTO 193 (1984); Caroni, L'arbitratorituale e le nuove
modifiche, in TEMI ROMANA 298 (1983); Carpi, Gli aspetti processuali della riforma
dell'arbitrato,in RiviSTA TRIMESTRALE Di DirrrO E PROCEDURA CWILE 47 (1984); Fazzalari, Primo incontro con una.., lieta novella, in RASSEGNA DELL'ARBITRATO, 10- 20, at
1 (1983); Ferrante, Legge 9 Febbraio 1983, n. 28 e prospettive di sviluppo dell'arbitrato
rituale, in RASSEGNA DEL'ARBRATo 251 (1982); Franchi, Brevissime osservazioni sulla
legge 9 Febbraio 1983, n. 28, contenente modificazioni alla disciplina dell'arbitrato,in
RIVISTA DI DiRrro CIVILE 219 (1983); Giardina, La nuova disciplina dell'arbitratoin
Italia, in RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO E PROCESSUALE 449 (1983);
Montesano, Sugli effetti e sulle impugnazioni del lodo nella recente riforma
dell'arbitratorituale, in FORO ITALIANO, 160 (1983); Nicoletti, La legge 9 Febbraio 1983,
n. 28, e la modifica dell'arbitrato,in GIURISPRUDENZA ITALIANA 308 (1983); Nicotina, LA
DICHIARAZIONE DI ESECUTIVITA DEL LODO ARBITRALE

(1983); Nobili, Laformazione del lodo

arbitrale e la legge 9 Febbraio 1983, n. 28 in

RASSEGNA DELL'ARBITRATO, 10.20, at 21
(1983); Punzi, La Riforma sull'arbitrato,in RVISTA Di Diarrro PROCESSUALE, 7-8 (1983);
Recchia, Nuove prospettive sull'arbitrato commerciale in Italia, in RASSEGNA

10-20, at 41 (1983); Ricci, Legge 9 Febbraio 1983, n. 28: modificazioni
COMMENro LEGGI CWi 733 (1983); Selvaggi, Legge 9
Febbraio 1983, n. 28 e l'efficacia del lodo arbitrale, in RASSEGNA DELL'ARBITRATO, 10-20,
at 69 (1983); Sette, La nuova normativa in tema di arbitrato,in LEGALITA E GiUSTIZIA 72
(1983).
DELL'ARBITRATO,

alla disciplina dell'arbitrato,in
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differences,22 is that arbitrato rituale, in full abidance with the
principles laid down in the New York Convention, should be
construed as consisting of two stages. The first stage exhausts
itself at the moment the signing of the award by the arbitrators
is completed, when the award thus acquires "binding force between the parties" under the proviso of article 823 of the C.I.C.
as amended. The second stage then opens up, in which the parties, at their sole discretion, may secure enforcement of the
award in Italy by depositing the award with the Magistrate
Court (Pretore)within one year from receipt of the award itself.
Should the parties elect not to effect the deposit within one year
(a decision which is now faculative), the award will remain in
force at the contractual level, in other words, merely binding between the parties.
Under a minority view,2" the award already at the binding
stage can be deemed to have acquired the status of res judicata,
with the sole limitation that it cannot be used to start execution
proceedings against the debtor with the aim of attaching its assets. This further result can be reached only after securing the
exequatur from the Magistrate Court by means of the deposit as
described above.
To fully understand the impact of this doctrinal "querelle"
one should expound on the notion of res judicata as elaborated
by the Italian doctrine, which draws a distinction between res
judicata in a formal sense and in a substantial sense.24 This dual
notion cannot be fully equated with the theories prevailing in
other countries; however, a comparative essay on this interesting
subject matter would be redundant in view of the purposes of
this Article.
It is respectfully submitted that the doctrinal dispute in
progress in Italy, whilst susceptible of having a certain impact
on the legal qualification of domestic awards, does not carry any
substantial weight on the system of enforcement provided for
22. An exhaustive definition of the legal nature of the award stemming from arbitrato rituale was formulated by Montesano, supra note 21. Other writers also emphasize
the contractual nature of the award in arbitrato rituale, by adopting theoretical arguments which sometimes diverge in the framework of each individual theory. See, e.g.,
Andrioli, Bernini, Carpi, Fazzalari, Ferrante, Giardina, Punzi, Recchia, supra note 21.
23. See Ricci and Selvaggi, supra note 21.
24. M. CAPPELLETTI & J. PERILLO, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN ITALY, 251 et. seq. (1965).
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under the New York Convention. That system is based upon the
notion of a "binding" award, as opposed to the system formerly
prevailing under the Geneva Convention of 1927.25 In conclusion, whether one adopts the majority or minority view as put
forward by Italian writers, there is no doubt whatsoever that the
ghost of "double exequatur" has finally faded away. This was
just the result that the lawmaker wanted to achieve by enacting
the new law.
IX.

Arbitration Between State or Public Entities and
Foreign-Owned Business Firms.

This topic is of paramount importance in the framework of
contemporary practice of arbitration at the international level. It
therefore deserves mention to complete the picture of the legal
discipline of arbitration prevailing in Italy today.
No special legislative rules exist in Italy concerning participation of State or public entites (governments or government
controlled bodies, to use an accepted terminology) in international arbitration. The problem, therefore, must be approached,
as it is in other countries, in light of the principles prevailing at
the international level with regard to a number of critical issues
which are generally included within the scope of this complex
subject matter. The doctrinal contributions and the precedents
(arbitral as well as judicial) are overwhelming; the ad hoc treatment of this many-sided problem would, therefore, exceed the
bounds of a study mainly devoted to domestic legislation." As
succinctly stated by article 10(1) of the Constitution, "The Italian legal order shall conform to the generally recognized rules of
international law." The Constitution further provides that:
Italy renounces war as an instrument of offense against the liberty of other peoples and as a means of resolving international
disputes; she will agree, on conditions of equality with other
States, to the limitations of her sovereignity necessary to an organization for assuring peace and justice among nations; and will
promote and favor international organizations constituted for this
25. Convention for the Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Sept. 26, 1927, 92
L.N.T.S. 302. See supra note 19.
26. For a recent survey of the problem see K. BOCKSTIEGEL, ARBITRATION AND STATE
ENTERPRISE (1984).
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purpose.

This propensity to international law paves the ground for the
recognition, as a part of the Italian legal order, of internationally
accepted principles such as pacta sunt servanda and just compensation for expropriatory measures (the latter being expressly
consecrated in article 42(3) of the same Constitution). Furthermore, as a due corollary to the above principles, the doctrine of
sovereign immunity has been construed by Italian courts in a
28
restrictive fashion.
In view of the above, one may soundly argue that Italy is
wide open to the prevailing trend favoring international trade
and cooperation, and that there is no reason to believe that the
general legal principles applying to international commercial
arbitation
do not apply when one of the parties is a State or another public
entity, only in view of this particular circumstance. As far as the
applicable international conventions are concerned, this does not
seem to be open to doubt, especially in view of the broad wording,
and even more the broad policy of the New York Convention.
The practice of courts and of arbitral tribunals confirm this
assumption. 9
In Italy, the Court of Cassation has manifested full awareness
concerning the impact of the most advanced theories in the field
of international trade and arbitration law. In a recent judgment,3 0 which is possibly open to criticism as to the decision of
the case at issue but is to be praised for its intrinsic cultural
weight,"' the learned justices unequivocally underlined a number
of facts and circumstances which can be summarized as follows:
1. a mercantile "societas" has not come into existence,
composed of merchants and economic operators which have
27.

COSTITUZIONE

art. 11 (Italy).

28. M. CAPPELLETTI & J. PERRILLO, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN ITALY 96 (1965).

29. Luzzatto, International Commercial Arbitration and the Municipal Law of
States, in 157 RECEUIL DES COURS 9, 87-88 (Academy of International Law 1977) (footnote omitted).
30. Judgment of Feb. 8, 1982, Court of Cassation, No. 722, reprinted in 9 YB. CoM.
ARm.418 (1984).
31. Goldman, Lex Mercatoria in FORUM INTERNATIONALE 20 (1983); Giardina, Arbitrato Transnazionalee Lex Mercatoria,in RIVISTA DI DIRITO INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO E
PROCESSUALE

754 (1982).
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agreed and convened on the binding force of certain common
principles and rules;
2. transnational or mercantile law (lex mercatoria) has acquired, as a body of precepts, full status of citizenship, and mercantile (or commercial) arbitration is to be placed within this
framework of this body of precepts;
3. the ensemble of binding principles thus identified is independent of the municipal law of the States and: "its assertion
takes place through the adhesion of the economic
operators to
32
the values of their environment (milieu);

4. in the mercantile "societas," lacking organized structures and bodies institutionally expressing norms, the law is to
be detected at the "diffused" state;
5. lacking sovereign powers, the mercantile "societas" is
forced to resort to the enforcement power of sovereign systems,
such as the national States.
It should also be recalled, with reference to international
commercial arbitration, that in addition to the other multilateral
conventions, Italy has also adhered to the Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States. 8 The ensuing result is that no antagonism
can be said to exist between the basic principles of the Italian
legal order and recourse to arbitration as a means of settling disputes involving the State as well as other public entities. As a
matter of record, Italian state controlled bodies have already
participated in ICSID arbitrations. 4
In the light of this background, it appears safe to argue that
the doctrines developed at the international level concerning arbitration with States and state controlled bodies are in tune
with the philosophy already prevailing in Italy. No major
problems can therefore be envisaged concerning issues such as
implied waiver of sovereign immunity through the signing of an
arbitration agreement, the abidance with the principles of pacta
sunt servanda and "just compensation" for expropriatory mea32. Judgment of Feb. 8,1982, Court of Cassation, No. 722, reprinted in 9 Y.B. CoM.
Ar. 418 (1984).
33. Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 160.

34. See the arbitral award in AGIP Company S.P.A. (Italy) v. Popular Republic of
the Congo, 64 RIVISTA DI DirPro INTERNAZIONALE 863 (1981) (French original), 21 I.L.M.
726 (1982) (English translation), 8 Y.B. COM. Are. 133 (1983) (English translation).
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sures, or the acknowledgement that contracts between States
and private law persons can be removed, at least to a certain
extent, from domestic law and made subject to international
rules.35

35. The literature on this subject is vast. For a summary of the issues involved see
the Award of Feb. 16, 1983, No. 3493, rendered under the Rules for the ICC Court of
Arbitration, in SPP (Middle East) Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt (First defendant) and
the Egyptian General Company for Tourism and Hotels (Second defendant), in 9 Y.B.
COM. ARB. 111 (1984).
The arbitrators, when dealing with the problem of the so called "denationalisation
of the applicable law," expressed themselves as follows:
The theories which have emerged on the subject differ sometimes to a considerable extent. Some have gone so far as to invoke under certain circumstances full
"denationalisation" of international contracts to the extent that they should only
be governed by Rules and Principles drawn from International practice and Trade
usages. Others do not discard the reference to domestic laws, provided, however,
that even when placed within the legal framework of a domestic system, arbitrators are empowered to apply those principles of international law which ensure
protection to the contractual rights of the private party vis-A-vis the sovereign
state.
In the field of international investments the problem has been expressly dealt
with in Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention reading as follows:
The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of the
law as may be agreed by the parties. In the absence of such agreement, the
Tribunal shall apply the law of the Contracting State party of the dispute
(including its rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules of international
law as may be applicable.
Obviously the specific proviso of art. 42 only applies to investment agreements and disputes that may arise thereunder. However, we take the view that "in
the world today, there is no reason why this solution should be limited to a particular category of state contracts. In other words, the rule formulated in article 42
can be considered as illustrative of a principle of wider application." [Delaume,
State Contracts and Transnational Arbitration, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 784, 786
(1981)].
9 Y.B. COM. ARE. 116 (1984).
For further general reference on the subject, see, e.g., Goldman, supra note 31; R.
DAVID, supra note 20; B~ckstiegel, The Legal Rules Applicable in InternationalCommercial Arbitration Involving States or State Controlled Enterprises, in INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION, - 60 YEARS OF ICC ARBITRATION 117 (1984); 1 W. L. CRAIG, W. PARK & J.
PAULSSON, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION § 36.01-.04 (1984); A. J.
VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958, at 29-40 (1981).
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